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This research evaluates the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program acquisition 
of  Pratt & Whitney (P&W) F135 and the General Electric Aircraft Engines/Rolls 
Royce (GEAE/RR) F136 engines.  This study examines existing research on the 
first ‘Great Engine War’. 
 
The first Great Engine War was an attempt by the Government to 
encourage Pratt & Whitney, the sole winner of the F-16 fighter engine propulsion 
contract, to be more responsive to shortcomings in design and support.  When 
P&W declared that any design changes would be out of the scope of the current 
contract, the government contracted with GEAE to produce an alternate engine 
design to compete against P&W.  The competition was a success.  
 
The study also includes Interviews with veterans of the Great Engine War. 
The findings are balanced against the current JSF acquisition planning to ensure 
applicability.   
 
The research and analysis yielded the following recommendations to 
guide the JSF future engine acquisition: ensure airframe commonality for both 
engines, continue to purchase and support the engines as Government-
Furnished Equipment (GFE), utilize supportability costs as competition criteria, 
maintain a concerted effort to encourage both competitors to attempt to win the 






















Figure 2.   Joint Strike Fighter (Artist Concept) 
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The purpose of the study is to research and evaluate the F-16 Great 
Engine War and derive recommendations which will guide Joint Strike Fighter 
Engine Program competition between Pratt & Whitney (P&W) and the General 
Electric Aircraft Engines/Rolls Royce (GEAE/RR) Fighter Engine Team.  The 
objective is to gather the different viewpoints and identify the opportunities and 
challenges of this ongoing competition between two large companies for a large 
stake in the future of military aviation for the next 40 years.   
 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this paper encompasses a detailed review of the current 
literature on the first great engine war and F-16 propulsion acquisition.  Included 
is the most recent acquisition strategy for the Joint Strike Fighter program drawn 
from unclassified sources and publicly disseminated information.  Detailed 
interviews were performed with key stakeholders from the F-16 engine 
acquisition and Joint Strike Fighter Program.  The interviews were studied using   
qualitative analysis to understand motives and to derive the recommendations. 
 
C. BACKGROUND 
1. The First Great Engine War 
The first ‘Great Engine War’ was born of the engine acquisition for the new 
US Air Force (USAF) lightweight fighter, the F-16 Fighting Falcon.  The engine 
from the F-15 Eagle was selected to power the nimble aircraft.   However, there 
were reliability problems with the Pratt & Whitney (P&W) F100 engine powering 
the F-15.  In F-15 operational use and early in the F-16 flight test program the 
engine experienced compressor stall problems and higher than anticipated 
turbine blade fatigue.  P&W was reluctant to resolve these issues under the 
scope of current contract.  The P&W stance was that the failures were pilot-
2 
induced.  The company requested more funding from the government to fix the 
problems for the Air Force.  To improve contractor responsiveness and reduce 
operational risk, the USAF sought another source of fighter engines.   
 
Figure 3.   YF-16 Prototype (F-16.Net, 2005)  
 
The government proceeded to contract with General Electric Aircraft Engines 
(GEAE) to build a suitable engine to compete with the F100 for F-16C/D Block 30 
aircraft acquisition.  The GEAE F110-GE-220 engine was successful and the 
competition did motivate P&W to improve their engine design as well.   
 
2. F-16 Program Description 
The F-16 has been a highly successful fighter aircraft program.  The 
Fighting Falcon is operated by the US Air Force and many allied nations.  It has 
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been instrumental in many victories including the recent Global War on 
Terrorism.  Global Security.Org is an excellent source for the history of the F-16: 
The air war experience in Vietnam highlighted the lack of 
maneuverability of USAF F-4 Phantom II fighters at transonic 
speeds.  This provided advantages to nimble enemy fighters and 
became the stimulus for the Lightweight Fighter program.  
The Air Force and designers of the Lightweight Fighter therefore 
placed great emphasis on achieving unprecedented transonic 
maneuver capability with excellent handling qualities.  
In January 1972, the Lightweight Fighter Program solicited design 
specifications from several American manufacturers. Participants 
were told to tailor their specifications toward the goal of developing 
a true air superiority lightweight fighter. General Dynamics (GD) 
and Northrop were asked to build prototypes, which could be 
evaluated with no promise of a follow-on production contract. These 
were to be strictly technology demonstrators. The two contractors 
were given creative freedom to build their own vision of a 
lightweight air superiority fighter, with only a limited number of 
specified performance goals. Northrop produced the twin-engine 
YF-17, using breakthrough aerodynamic technologies and two 
high-thrust engines. General Dynamics countered with the compact 
YF-16, built around a single P&W F100 engine.  
The evolution of the YF-16 design included studies of configuration 
variables such as wing design, maneuvering devices, number and 
location of engines, control surfaces, number and location of tail 
surfaces, and structural concepts. As the configuration options 
matured, two candidate configurations competed for priority. The 
first configuration was a simple wing, body, and empennage 
design, while the second design was a twin-tailed, blended-wing 
body with vertical and horizontal tails on booms. The team selected 




Figure 4.   An F-16 demonstrates its remarkably tight turning radius against an F-4E 
(Nederveen, 2004) 
 
Increased maneuverability for the YF-16 necessitated extended 
flight at high angles of attack where aerodynamic deficiencies 
caused by separated airflow can result in sudden decreases in 
stability and controllability. Therefore, special emphasis was placed 
on tests to insure that the YF-16 could provide the pilot with “care-
free” maneuverability. To provide superior handling characteristics 
at high angles of attack, any undesirable handling characteristics 
were pushed out of the operating envelope of the aircraft and the 
flight envelope was limited with an advanced fly-by-wire flight 
control system by design. This concept has proven to be highly 
successful and has been used in all variants of the F-16.  
When the Lightweight Fighter competition was completed early in 
1975, both the YF-16 and the YF-17 showed great promise. The 
two prototypes performed so well, in fact, that both were selected 
for military service1. On 13 January 1975 the Air Force announced 
that the YF-16's performance had made it the winner of its Air 
Combat Fighter (ACF) competition. This marked a shift from the 
                                            
1 The YF-17 soon became the USN F/A-18 Hornet. 
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original intention to use the two airplanes strictly as technology 
demonstrators. General Dynamics' YF-16 had generally shown 
superior performance over its rival from Northrop. At the same time, 
the shark-like fighter was judged to have production costs lower 
than expected, both for initial procurement and over the life cycle of 
the plane. At the same time, the YF-16 had proved the usefulness 
not only of fly-by-wire flight controls, but also such innovations as 
reclined seat backs and transparent head-up display (HUD) panels 
to facilitate high-G maneuvering, and the use of high profile, one-
piece canopies to give pilots greater visibility. Thus, the Air Force 
had its lightweight fighter, the F-16. (Global Security, 2005)   
On December 9, 1992, Lockheed bought out the Fort Worth Division of 
General Dynamics for $1.525B in cash. The plant would now operate as the 
Lockheed Fort Worth Company. This marked the end of production of complete 
aircraft by General Dynamics.2  The manufacture of the F-16 would, however, 
still continue at Fort Worth, with the aircraft now being known as the Lockheed F-
16.  
Foreign countries also were licensed to assemble airframes and engines.  
The F-16 Fighting Falcon continues its historic evolution, honing its edge in 
meeting new operational requirements both in the defense marketplace and in 
combat, according to John Bean, Vice President for Lockheed Martin F-16 
programs (Brannan, 2003): 
[The] F-16 is still the most modern, capable and sought-after 
international production fighter today.  It has been proven in combat 
time after time, including recent operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and both wars in Iraq.  
 “The F-16 international family marks its 25th anniversary this year,” 
Bean said. “Since 1979, partnerships with our allies and coalition 
countries have grown to 24, including the United States. And we 
have every reason to believe that our international family will 
continue to grow.  With a win rate of 100 percent in competitions for 
authorized programs, the F-16 proves time and again it is the 
world’s most sought-after fighter jet.”  
                                            
2 , the remaining elements of the company now being involved only in the manufacture of 
submarines, the M1A1 tank, airliner components, missiles, space systems, and electronics. 
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The F-16 is the choice of 24 countries.  More than 4,000 aircraft 
have been delivered, hundreds more are on order, and production 
is expected to continue beyond 2010.  Major upgrades for all F-16 
versions are being incorporated to keep the fleet modern and fully 
supportable over the aircraft’s long service life.  
 
F-16 production continued with each successive design improvement 
grouped into ‘blocks’.  The F-16A/Bs ended with Block 20.  The F-16C/Ds begin 
with Block 25 and continue through Block 50/52.  There have also been many 
design variants to test different wings, flight control schemes, and engine 
nozzles. 
The last F-16s produced will be the FMS-only Block 60 (F-16E/F) Desert 
Falcon produced for the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  The Block 60s will have 
the following features, (which set it apart from the most modern Block 50 F-16s in 
the US Air Force inventory):  
• Conformal fuel tanks mounted above the wing root, which 
allow for a mission radius of 1,025 miles with no in-flight 
refueling. This amounts to a 40 percent increase over the 
range of the current Block 50 F-16.  
• Internal forward-looking infrared targeting system mounted 
into the nose of the aircraft, which replaces the external pods 
on earlier F-16 models. This reduces drag and lowers the 
radar cross section of the aircraft, making detection by the 
enemy more difficult.  
• Agile-beam radar, which employs an active, electronically 
scanned antenna to achieve the wide bandwidth necessary 
to support the Desert Falcon’s mission. The radar relies on a 
fixed panel of transmitters and receptors that can broadcast 
beams quickly and in every direction.  
• Electronic countermeasures suite with internal electronic 
countermeasures and an electronic-warfare management 
system designed to foil Russian double-digit surface-to-air 
missiles such as the SA-10 and SA-12.  
• Advanced mission computer to enhance sensor and weapon 
integration.  
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• Three five-inch by five-inch color displays in the cockpit and 
a helmet-mounted cueing system to improve situational 
awareness of the pilot. (Nederveen, 2000)   
 
3. Pratt & Whitney F100 Engine Description 
Because Pratt & Whitney powered the prototype YF-16 (with the P&W 
F100 engine from the F-15) they were naturally selected to power the winning 
General Dynamics aircraft design.  
Pratt & Whitney and the U.S. Air Force initiated development of the F100-
PW-220 specifically for the F-16.  It was similar to the F-15 engine, but featured 
an increased life core section, a digital electronic engine control, a gear-type fuel 
pump, improved augmenter, and an engine diagnostics unit.   
The F100-PW-100 for the F-15 was an extremely innovative engine that 
pushed the boundaries of contemporary technology, especially in the area of 
exotic high-temperature materials.  A tight Air Force schedule and budget left 
little room for dealing with the inevitable technical problems, schedule slippage, 
and cost growth.  In June 1971, the Navy pulled out of the program because of 
continuing technical development problems, dramatically increasing the program 
costs for the Air Force.   
 
 
Figure 5.   F100-PW-220 
 
Not only did development problems continue through full scale 
development and flight testing, but the engine went into production before 
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development was completed.  Fixes done under government-funded Component 
Improvement Programs continued after the engine entered service with the F-15 
in late 1974.  The engine was extremely powerful and capable but continued to 
experience severe operational and reliability problems.  The F100 engine was so 
powerful and the F-15 so maneuverable that pilots began pushing the aircraft to 
the edge of the performance envelope in ways that stressed the engine far more 
than had been anticipated.  These stresses resulted in much worse reliability and 
maintenance problems than were originally expected.  In addition, new heavy-
maneuvering air-to-air combat tactics developed by Air Force pilots revealed 
another problem: compressor stall caused by strong dynamic airflow distortion in 
the engine inlet.  Severe compressor stall could lead to engine flame out, 
requiring the pilot to restart the engine in flight.  This problem caused particular 
concern because the F100 was planned for use on the single-engine General 
Dynamics F-16 as well as on the dual-engine F-15 (Baugher, 2000): 
When it first flew, the YF-16 seemed to be almost free of the 
stagnation stall problems which had bedeviled the F-15.  However, 
while flying with an early model of the F100 engine, one of the YF-
16s did experience a stagnation stall, although it occurred outside 
the normal performance envelope of the aircraft.  Three other 
incidents later occurred, all of them at high angles of attack during 
low speed flights at high altitude.  The first such incident in a 
production F-16 occurred with a Belgian aircraft flying near the 
limits of its performance envelope.  Fortunately, the pilot was able 
to get his engine restarted and land safely.  The F-16 was fitted 
with a jet-fuel starter, and from a height of 35,000 feet the pilot 
would have enough time to attempt at least three unassisted starts 
using ram air.  
When the F100 engine control system was originally designed, 
Pratt & Whitney engineers had allowed for the possibility that the 
ingestion of missile exhaust might stall the engine.  A "rocket-fire" 
facility was designed into the controls to prevent this from 
happening.  When missiles were fired, an electronic signal was sent 
to the unified fuel control system which supplied fuel to the engine 
core and to the afterburner.  This signal commanded the angle of 
the variable stator blades in the engine to be altered to avoid a stall, 
while the fuel flow to the engine was momentarily reduced and the 
afterburner exhaust was increased in area to reduce the magnitude 
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of any pressure pulse in the afterburner.  Tests had shown that this 
"rocket-fire" facility was not needed for its primary purpose of 
preventing missile exhaust stalls, but it turned out to be handy in 
preventing stagnation stalls.  Engine shaft speed, turbine 
temperature, and the angle of the compressor stator blades are 
continuously monitored by a digital electronic engine control unit 
which fine-tunes the engine throughout flight to ensure optimal 
performance.  By monitoring and comparing spool speeds and fan 
exhaust temperature, the unit is able to sense that a stagnation stall 
is about to occur and send a dummy "rocket-fire" signal to the fuel 
control system to initiate the anti-stall measures described above.  
At the same time, the fuel control system reduces the afterburner 
setting to help reduce the pressure within the jetpipe.  
The afterburner-induced stalls were addressed by a different 
mechanism.  In an attempt to prevent pulses from coming forward 
through the fan duct, a "proximate splitter" was developed.  This is 
a forward extension of the internal casing which splits the incoming 
air from the compressor fan and passes some of this air into the 
core and diverts the rest down the fan duct and into the afterburner.  
By closing the gap between the front end of this casing and the rear 
of the fan to just under half an inch, the designers reduced the size 
of the path by which high-pressure pulses from the burner had 
been reaching the core.  Engines fitted with the proximate splitter 
were tested in the F-15, but this feature was not introduced on the 
F-15 production line, since the loss of a single engine was less 
hazardous in a twin-engined aircraft like the Eagle.  However, this 
feature was adopted for the single-engined F-16.  
These engine fixes produced a dramatic improvement in reliability.  
Engines fitted to the F-16 fleet (and incorporating the proximate 
splitter) had only 0.15 stagnation stalls per 1000 hours of flying 
time, much better than the F-15 fleet.  
There were other problems associated with the F100 engines.  The down-
stream effects of the stresses of the design affected internal component life also. 
The compressor stall problem also contributed to another major 
shortcoming—turbine blade fatigue and failures that had the potential of 
destroying the aircraft in flight.  To avoid potentially catastrophic accidents, 
performance limitations were placed on pilots, and mechanics had to de-rate the 
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life of the engine (Younossi, O., Arena, M., Moore, R., Lorell, M., Mason, J., & 
Grasser, J., 2002). 
The Air Force turned to P&W to fix these problems under the existing 
contract.  P&W argued that it had delivered an engine that met the original 
performance specifications.  The problem, according to P&W, was that the Air 
Force pilots began operating the engine in a much more demanding environment 
than had originally been specified.  Therefore, P&W argued that the Air Force 
should provide additional developmental money to fix the problems. (Baugher, 
2000) 
 
4. General Electric Aircraft Engine F110 Description 
In 1984 the Department of Defense awarded General Electric Aircraft 
Engines (GEAE) a contract to build a small number of F101 Derivative Fighter 
Engines (DFE) for flight test3. The DFE was based on the F101 used in the B-1 
aircraft but incorporated components derived from the F404 engine used in the 
F/A-18.  The tests were very successful and showed the feasibility of the 
alternate engine. 
 
Figure 6.   F110-GE-100 
 
                                            
3 The Navy later decided to adopt the DFE as a replacement for the F-14 Tomcat P&W TF30 
turbofan. 
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The GEAE F110-GE-100 is a dual-rotor augmented turbofan engine in the 
27,000 lb. thrust class.  The parts of the F110 core4 are 92% common to the 
F101 and 60% common to the F108 (for the USAF KC-135 Stratotanker).  The 
low pressure turbine and augmentor are scaled from the F101 engine.  The F110 
also has a scaled up inlet fan and exhaust nozzle from the F404 engine. (Hoover, 
1986, p. 3) 
Moreover, the F110 design was kept conservative with no cutting edge 
materials or design practices.   This allowed high maturity and confidence in the 
design when production started. 
 At the time of its introduction in December 1985, this core had 
accumulated more than 3.5 million hours of ground test, flight test, and 
operational flight hours (Hoover, 1986, p. 3).  This greatly reduced risk for the 
alternate engine and helped speed its introduction.  
 
5. F-16 Engine Competition (“The Great Engine War”)  
As a result of the Pratt & Whitney situation, the USAF became interested 
in acquiring an alternative engine for the F-16C/D.  The goal was to convince 
P&W to address the problems inherent to their design because the Government 
could have another source for engines.  The challenge to the sole-source 
situation would change P&W corporate responses.   
The development of a source for an alternate engine for the Navy's F-14 
Tomcat gave the Government just such an opportunity to challenge Pratt & 
Whitney.    
On 5 March 1979, the Air Force contracted with GEAE for initial 
development of an F101 derivative from the B-1 program for F-16 use.  GEAE’s 
task was to put an engine in the F-16 and fly it successfully before 30 months 
had elapsed.  (Drewes, 1987, p. 98)   
                                            
4 Defined as the fan through exhaust frame, comprising most of the engine less the 
augmentor and exhaust nozzle sections 
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The P&W response to a proposed competition was not to try harder to 
please the customer, i.e. the USAF, rather they attempted to get Congress to 
force the customer to abandon the alternate engine competition. 
Because the availability of money was the key element for success of the 
Air Force strategy, P&W chose to fight the GEAE engine alternative at the source 
of the money, Capitol Hill.  In February and March of 1979, a series of thorough, 
intensely debated Congressional hearings were held on Air Force intentions 
toward the F100 and a GEAE alternative.  Leading the charge for P&W was the 
Connecticut delegation, particularly Congressman Giamo, in hearings that 
became a forum for venting all of P&W’s concerns. (Drewes, 1987, p. 100) 
These corporate tactics only increased the resolve of the US Air Force to 
proceed with the competition.  The development of a successful alternate engine 
continued.  In the end, the USAF leadership prevailed and authorized the F-16 
System Program Office (SPO) to release the Request for Proposal (RFP) to both 
engine companies.  
All F110s ordered by the USAF were for the F-16 fleet, with the F-15 
retaining the F100. The choice of engines for the F-16 began with the Fiscal Year 
1985 Block 30 F-16C/Ds.  
The GEAE engine proposal was a success and actually won 57% of the 
first year competition, 54% in the second year, and 56% in the third year.    Pratt 
regrouped and was able to win 55% in the fourth year, 57% in the fifth year of the 





Figure 7.   Block 30 F110-GE-100 
 
 
Figure 8.   Block 32 F100-PW-220 
 
It was never intended that individual squadrons or wings would operate 
with a mixed fleet of F-16s powered by two different engine types, since that 
would create a spare parts and logistics nightmare.  
The F-16C/D Block 30 aircraft (see Figure 7.) was the first airframe 
introduced with the GEAE F110-GE-100 engine as a powerplant option.  
The F-16C/D Block 32 airframes (see Figure 8.) were powered by the 
F100-PW-220 engine. In spite of the so-called Common Engine Bay, the two 
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powerplants are not interchangeable (Fieser, 2003).  Each Block of aircraft could 
only ever have the applicable F100 or F110 installed.   
In an attempt to make the F100 more competitive with the GEAE F110, 
Pratt & Whitney introduced the more powerful F100-PW-229 version in the early 
1990s. This engine is rated at 29,100 pounds of thrust with full afterburner. It has 
higher fan airflow and pressure ratio, higher-airflow compressor with an extra 
stage, new float-wall combustor, higher turbine temperatures, and a redesigned 
afterburner. It has about 22 percent more thrust than previous F100 models. The 
first F-16s powered by the -229 engines began to be delivered in 1992. However, 
the degree of mechanical changes introduced in the -229 made it impractical to 
rebuild -200 or -220E engines to -229 standards.  
On the export market, the higher thrust of the F110 made it the engine of 
choice through the mid to late 1980s. The more powerful F100-PW-229 finally 
gave P&W the chance of re-entering the export market. In 1991, South Korea 
chose the F100-PW-229 for its license-built F-16s. 
 The F100-PW-200+ is intended for foreign air forces which operate 
significant numbers of F-16s that are powered by -200 and -220E engines, but 
which are denied access to the more powerful -229. It combines the core of the -
220 with the fan, nozzle, and digital control system of the -229. It develops 
around 27,000 pounds of thrust with afterburning.  
 
6. Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) Program 
The JAST Program was created to explore ways to affordably meet a 
shortfall in our fighter force for a new multi-role fighter.  The JAST program 
began when the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) determined that a separate 
tactical aviation modernization program by each Service was not affordable and 
discontinued the Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) and Advanced Strike Aircraft (A/F-X) 




Figure 9.   F-35B Short Take Off/Vertical Land (STOVL) 
 
  In 1994 the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) was 
integrated into JAST as well. The CALF Advanced Short Take Off/Vertical Land 
(ASTOVL) concepts were originally seen as developing a replacement for the 
U.S. and U.K. Harrier jump-jet. The ASTOVL concepts became multi-service with 
the planning of multiple variants. 
The management of the CALF program was handled by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) due to the experimental nature of 
the concept.  The CALF program goal was to develop the technologies and 
concepts to support the ASTOVL aircraft for the USMC and Royal Navy (RN) and 
a highly-common conventional flight variant for the U.S. Air Force (JSF Public 
Affairs, CALF Description, p.1). 
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Figure 10.   JAST Logo 
 
After a DoD review of the program in August 1995, the JSF program 
emerged from the JAST effort.  Fiscal Year 1995 legislation merged the DARPA 
ASTOVL program with the JSF Program. This action drew the United Kingdom 
(UK) Royal Navy into the program, extending a collaboration begun under the 
DARPA ASTOVL program. (Federation of American Scientists, 2005) 
 
7. Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Description 
The JSF will meet the need to be capable of meeting the current and 
future needs of the USAF, USN, USMC and partner countries to affordably and 
effectively replace such existing systems as the F-16, F/A-18, AV-8B, and A-10.  
The JSF program will also pit P&W against GEAE for the acquisition of the 
engines powering the aircraft.   
The tri-service family would entail a single basic airframe design with three 
distinct variants: Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) for the U.S. Air 
Force (USAF) to complement the F/A-22 Raptor and replace the aging F-16 
Fighting Falcon and the A-10 Thunderbolt; Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing 
(STOVL) for the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) to replace both the AV-8B Harrier 
and the F/A-18C/D Hornet; and a Carrier (CV) variant for the U.S. Navy (USN) to 
replace the F/A-18A-Ds and to complement the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet.  
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Figure 11.   JSF Logo 
 
Boeing, Lockheed Martin Aerospace Company (LMAC), McDonnell 
Douglas, and Northrop Grumman were each awarded fifteen-month Concept 
Definition and Design Research (CDDR) contracts in December 1994. Northrop 
Grumman and McDonnell Douglas/British Aerospace teamed shortly after the 
CDDR contracts were awarded. The contractors refined their Preferred Weapons 
System Concept (PWSC) designs and performed a number of risk reduction 
activities (e.g., wind tunnel tests, powered-model STOVL tests, and engineering 
analyses).  
In the spring of 1995, all three of the contractor teams selected derivatives 
of the Pratt & Whitney (P&W) F119 engine to power their aircraft. Accordingly, in 
November 1995, P&W was awarded a contract for preliminary design of each of 
the primary JSF engine concepts.  The P&W F119 flight test engines performed 
very well during flight test with no problems noted. 
The Secretary of the Air Force selected the Lockheed team and awarded 
the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract.   
Foreign partners were sought to help finance the development and test of 
the program and in exchange, partners receive earlier acquisitions of the aircraft 
plus other financial and non-financial benefits.  The JSF program allows foreign 
countries to become program partners at one of three participation levels, based 
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on financial contribution.  As shown in Table 1, the foreign partners have 
contributed over $4.5 billion, or about 14 percent, for the system development 
and demonstration phase and are expected to purchase about 722 aircraft 
beginning in the 2012-2015 timeframe.  Israel and Singapore have recently 
begun to participate in the program as security cooperation participants, a non-
partner arrangement, which offers limited access to program information, without 
a program office presence.  According to DoD, foreign military sales to these and 
other non-partner countries could include an additional 1,500 to 3,000 aircraft. 
 
 
Figure 12.   F-35 Variants 
 
In return for their contributions, partner countries have representatives in 
the program office with access to program data and technology; membership on 
the management decision-making bodies; aircraft delivery priority over future 
foreign military sales participants; guaranteed or potential waiver of nonrecurring 
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aircraft costs; potential levies on future foreign military sales aircraft sold; and 
improved relationships for their industry with U.S. aerospace companies through 
JSF subcontracting opportunities. 
For example, the United Kingdom – which is committed to contribute just 
over $2 billion in the system development and demonstration phase – is a Level I 
full collaborative partner, with benefits such as: 
• 10 staff positions within the JSF Program Office, including senior 
positions on integrated product teams; 
• Participation in cost versus performance trade-off and requirement 
setting processes, resulting in British military needs being included in the 
JSF operational requirements document; and 
• Involvement in final source selection process for the system 
development and demonstration contract award. 
Conversely, the five Level III partners, which are committed to contribute 
between $125 million and $175 million, each have one program office staff 
member and no direct vote with regard to requirement decisions (Schinasi, 2003,  
p. 11).   
 
Table 1.   Foreign Partnerships (Schinasi, p. 10) 
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8. Joint Strike Fighter Propulsion Acquisition 
In the summer of 1995, Congress directed the JSF Joint Program Office 
(JPO) to pursue a second engine source.  The purpose was to maintain engine 
competition during production in the JSF program similar to the ‘Great Engine 
War’.  In late November 1995, initial development contracts were awarded to 
P&W for an F119 derivative (based on the engine for the F/A-22 Raptor) and to a 
GEAE/Allison (later Rolls Royce) team for design studies for the YF120 (based 
on the latest F110 variants) for the JSF (Younossi et al., 2002, p. 22). 





















Interchangeable F135 or F136 Engine
 
Figure 13.   Propulsion Commonality 
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The two basic engine designs (from front frame through the exhaust 
frame) would be interchangeable in the aircraft and share common modules 
(exhaust and lift system) and selected components (see Figure 13.).   
The requirement for a common aircraft with a common support system 
developed and integrated by Lockheed Martin has demanded that the two engine 
companies cooperate and share design data until the competition formally 
begins.  This unique relationship dubbed ‘coopetition’ (an amalgamation of 
cooperation and competition) is unprecedented in systems acquisition.  The 
mandate for a common support system alleviates the logistical impact of having 
two engine-specific: training systems, sets of support equipment, technical data 
systems, and logistic information management systems. 
The engines will develop and demonstrate the latest technology in 
Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) to predict impending failures and 
stimulate the support system to restore the engines before secondary damage or 
lost sorties occurred. 
The General Electric Aircraft Engines/Rolls Royce Fighter Engine Team 
(FET) would produce the F136 (based on the F120 design) lagging the F135 
design by approximately five years to be ready for procurement competition 
beginning in the year 2013.  The requirement for a common aircraft with a 
common support system developed and integrated by Lockheed Martin has 
demanded that the two engine companies cooperate and share design data until 
the competition formally begins.  This unique relationship dubbed ‘coopetition’ 
(an amalgamation of cooperation and competition) is unprecedented in systems 
acquisition. 
The JSF propulsion systems will be procured in seven Low Rate Initial 
Production (LRIP) Lots.  The F135 engines will be procured from P&W in LRIP I-
V.  The F136 engines will be procured on a non-competitive basis from the FET 
in LRIP IV-V.  The exact purchase split between P&W and the FET in lots IV-V 
has not been determined yet.  Competition between P&W and the FET will begin 
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in Lot VI.  Common propulsion system components will be procured on a sole-
source basis from P&W during LRIP Lots I-III.  The forces of competition, 
performance-based logistics, and contract incentives will lead to the best value 
for affordability, supportability, and safety.  
 
9. Pratt & Whitney F135 Engine Description 
The Pratt & Whitney F135 advanced propulsion system will utilize cutting 
edge technology to provide the F-35 with higher performance than conventional 
fighter aircraft.  The engine consists of a 3-stage fan, a 6-stage compressor, an 
annular combustor, a single stage high-pressure turbine, and a 2 stage low-
pressure turbine.  P&W also is designing and delivering the Lift Fan (from Rolls 
Royce) and other lift system components as well as the variable geometry 
nozzles specific to the STOVL and conventional variants. 
 
 
Figure 14.   P&W JSF119 engine and relationship to the F-22/F119 
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The F135 is currently in the System Design and Demonstration (SDD) 
Phase and is using the technology from the F/A-22 Raptor F119 engine core and 
the JSF119 which powered the JSF concept demonstrator aircraft for fly-off.   
During SDD the F135 test engines will undergo a range of ground and 
flight tests to simulate various mission profiles. In these tests, the engines will be 
run for hours throughout various flight envelopes to ensure they meet 
performance requirements.  The first CTOL F135 engine test occurred on 11 
October 2003. The First STOVL F135 engine test occurred on 14 April 2004. By 
the end of SDD, the F135 will have accumulated 10,000 operational test hours 
(JSF Public Affairs, F135 Description, 2003). 
 
10.  GEAE/RR F136 Engine Description 
The GEAE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team (FET) F136 engine lags the 
F135 development to match F136 engine design as closely as possible to that of 
the final aircraft configuration, thereby minimizing changes and keeping pace 
with evolving aircraft demands prior to entering SDD.  
 
Figure 15.   F136 Engine 
 
The F136 engine consists of a 3-stage fan, 5-stage compressor, a 3-stage 
low-pressure turbine section, single stage high-pressure turbine, and a radial 
augmentor based on the F110 and F120 Programs.  The Pre-SDD F120 engine 
was a growth engine from the F110. 
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The F136 team will transition into the SDD phase of their program later in 
2005.   The first F136 CTOL engine was successfully tested for the first time on 
22 July 2004. Testing on the first F136 STOVL propulsion system began on 10 
February 2005. (JSF Public Affairs, F135 Description, 2003). 
 
11. Rolls-Royce Lift System 
While Rolls-Royce is a member of the Fighter Engine Team with GEAE on 
the F136, they are also subcontracted to Pratt & Whitney on the F135 to provide 
the Lift System for the F-35. The Lift System is comprised of the Lift Fan, Clutch, 
Drive Shaft, Roll Posts and the Three Bearing Swivel Module (3BSM).   
 
 
Figure 16.   STOVL Lift Fan  
 
Lockheed Martin developed the idea for a Short Take-Off Vertical Landing 
(STOVL) lift system that uses a vertically oriented Shaft Driven Lift Fan (SDLF). 
A two-stage low-pressure turbine on the engine provides the horsepower 
necessary to power the Rolls-Royce-designed Lift Fan. The Lift Fan generates a 
column of cool air that provides nearly 20,000 pounds of lifting power using 
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variable inlet guide vanes to modulate the airflow, along with an equivalent 
amount of thrust from the downward vectored rear exhaust to lift the aircraft.  The 
Lift Fan utilizes a clutch that engages the shaft drive system for STOVL 
operations.  The SDLF concept was successfully demonstrated through a Large 
Scale Powered Model (LSPM) in 1995-96 and during the flight-testing of the X-
35B during the summer of 2001.  The Lift Fantm, a patented Lockheed Martin 
concept, is being produced by Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, Indiana and in 
Bristol, England (JSF Public Affairs, F135 Description, 2003). 
 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter explored the similarities and differences in the F-16 and JSF 
acquisitions and the overall approach of the study.   
The first Great Engine War began with early F-15 and later F-16 
operational testing.  The aggressive requirements and emphasis on high 
performance placed a high demand on Pratt & Whitney to deliver a great leap 
forward in propulsion technology.  The engine met or exceeded the performance 
requirements but unforeseen shortfalls caused compressor stalls and reduced 
engine durability.  The disagreement between the USAF and P&W over who 
would pay for the design fixes led to a rift in the relationship.  Rather than accept 
the ‘take it or leave it” approach from P&W, the USAF sought another source for 
engines.  The resultant competition produced another engine suitable for the 
USAF and did induce P&W to fix their design and become more responsive to 
the USAF’s needs.  The Joint Strike Fighter will also compete the procurement of 
engines to ensure each contractor is incentivized to produce the best design at 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
  The Great Engine War has been the subject of quite a few Masters Thesis 
topics and other directed studies.  The vast majority of the studies agree that the 
competition was successful.  Not surprisingly, each of the studies had a different 
perspective.  Some focused only on the cost/benefit, while others used a broader 
view to include the intangible aspects such as customer satisfaction and 
perceived industry attitudes.   
The Joint Strike Fighter program literature included below is topical in nature and 
purposely limited to the unclassified/public-releasable information to keep this 
paper unclassified. 
 
B. F-16 PROPULSION ACQUISITION 
  Many studies were done shortly after the first few years of the F-16 engine 
competition and are dated circa 1988.  My research centered on six 
representative studies.  Even though each one had a slightly different focus, they 
all agreed that the competition was the ‘right thing to do’ and that the outcome for 
the Government was positive as each company strived to improve their products.  
However, the cost studies are less definitive and cost may not be the lead factor 
in a future decision to compete the engines (see Table 2: Summary of Studies).  
General themes that emerged from each study were: 
• The competition was a great success 
• Cost savings were not a factor in the success 
• Competition improved manufacturer responsiveness  
• Competition should be pursued in future acquisition programs 





Yes No Large Small Inconclusive Improved Unimproved Yes No
Metamorphosis of Business Strategies and Air Force
Acquisition Policies in the Aerospace Propulsion
Industry: Case Study of the “Great Engine War” (Jon
Steven Ogg) √ √ √ √
The Air Force and the Great Engine War (Robert W.
Drewes Col, USAF) √ √ √ √
Analysis of the Air Force and the Great Engine War
(Victoria Mayes) √ √ √ √
Alternate Fighter Engines Competition Study (Jeffrey 
A. Hoover) √ √ √ √
The development of the F100-PW-220 and F110-GE-100
Engines: A Case Study of the Risk Assessment and
Risk Management  (Frank Camm) √ √ √ √
Fighter Engine Competition: A Study of Factors
Affecting Unit Price  (Brian R. Leginus) √ √ √ √
Reports
Successful Competition? Cost Savings? Responsiveness?
 
Table 2.   Summary of Studies 
 
 
1. Metamorphosis of Business Strategies and Air Force 
Acquisition Policies in the Aerospace Propulsion Industry:  
Case Study of the “Great Engine War” (Ogg, 1987) 
Perhaps the definitive summary of the ‘war’, it explored the history and the 
motives that guided the government and each of the engine companies.  It 
summarized the competition as a success, but qualified the declaration with a 
caveat that many factors came together and it should not be used as a blanket 
endorsement for competition in all future situations.   An interesting question 
posited is whether the funding used for development of the alternate engine 
could have been better utilized in fixing F100 design issues. 
Some conclusions and recommendations were: 
• Begin competition sooner.  By the time GEAE was brought 
in, P&W had already produced over 3,000 F100 engines for the F-
15 and F-16 programs.  
• Engine competition is inherently unique.   The market cannot 
be easily entered and exited.  Producers must be rigorously 
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evaluated for suitability and performance which leads to a very long 
lead time.  There is an enormous tooling and manufacturing 
production capability investment required.  Lastly, the aspect of 
national security cannot be ignored. 
• Politics plays a very influential role in the success and 
outcome of a competition.   
• In a competitive source process, the detailed cost data and 
certification process is unneeded.  This should streamline 




2. The Air Force and the Great Engine War (Drewes, 1987) 
A great over-all study of the competition, its conclusions were pro-
competition, with the following specific recommendations: 
• Competition forced Pratt to become much more incentivized 
to fund and implement changes to their design to improve reliability 
and performance. 
• Competition should be extended as far as feasible in the 
acquisition process, preferably until the last engine is bought.  
There is the recognition that competition may not make sense late 
in the program when only a few spare engines are being procured 
in small quantities where two manufacturers can’t sustain a 
production line. 
• Competition for engines requires a high volume to support a 
large fleet.  Competing the relatively small fleet of the B-2 Spirit 
F117 engine engines would likely be cost-prohibitive.  
• Stated the argument for using Total Accumulated Cycles 
(TACs) versus the standard ‘engine operating hours’ currently used 
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to measure the life consumed of a military engine.  It recognizes the 
increased rotor wear from throttle transients due to acceleration 
and deceleration stresses. 
 
3. Analysis of the Air Force and the Great Engine War (Mayes, 
1988) 
This Master’s Thesis was written for the Air Force Institute of Technology 
in pursuit of a degree in Logistics Management.  It was intended as a follow-up to 
the aforementioned book by Col Drewes.  It reinforced the positive outcome of 
the competition.  It focused on some of the logistical impacts to the customer. 
• Included a discussion comparing the USAF Great Engine 
War with the USN failed competition for engines in the F/A-18 
Hornet.  The USN competition failed because the competition was 
for a second vendor to build-to-print the original engine.  This failed 
as the original vendor (GEAE in this case) was not incentivized to 
provide complete assembly instruction to its competitor. 
• Highlighted the Pratt strategy for winner-take-all in the initial 
competition was unreasonable and showed the need for having a 
minimum sustainable buy from each vendor and competing the 
remainder of the buy. 
• Reinforced the positive attitude adjustment on the part of 
Pratt after losing the majority of the first few buys to GEAE. 
• Recommended that competition should be declared from the 
outset so each manufacturer can right-size their production 
capacity. 
• Recognized that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) tends to follow 
USAF acquisition lead.  Winning the majority of the USAF 
competition helped win the lion share of the FMS market also. 
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• The military engine market is different from a true ‘open’ 
market system in which manufacturers can freely enter or leave the 
market place.  The quasi-monopoly does not lend itself to truly 
lower prices, only an artificially supported industrial base. 
• Recommended tailoring the contract Statements of Work for 
each vendor to recognize the differences in the offerers. 
• Addressed the logistic impact of two engines on support 
equipment, sparing, and mixing two different engines in a squadron 
or Wing. 
 
4. Alternate Fighter Engines Competition Study (Hoover, 1986) 
Written from a contracts and cost analysis perspective, it is a good scrub 
of the financial aspects of the competition.   
• The process for submitting engine acquisition budget 
estimates in advance of the pricing offers from the manufacturers 
introduced unavoidable complexity.  No recommendation to 
alleviate this situation was offered. 
• Competition was beneficial from a cost aspect, but it is 
admittedly difficult to capture all the costs associated with the 
acquisition of two competing engines. 
 
5. The Development of the F100-PW-220 and F110-GE-100 
Engines: A Case Study of the Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management (Camm, 1993) 
This study looked at the dynamics of the competition from a program 
management stand point.  As the title states, the focus is the risk of new engine 
development and its transfer to the manufacturers under the competition.  Simply 
stated, the government won’t procure the engine that fails to meet the 
specification, so the contractor must assume the development cost risk. 
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• Continuity in System Program Office personnel and structure 
contributes to the success of engine competition and acquisition in 
general. 
• Discussed the impact of the high congressional and USAF 
management interest in the engine acquisition.  The special interest 
probably positively affected the scrutiny the contractors put in to 
their proposals. 
• Recognized the hurdle of funding and managing two engine 
programs to develop a competitive environment.  The next USAF 
fighter (to later become the F/A-22 Raptor) did not compete the 
engines but remained sole-source. 
• Contract type (fixed-fee versus cost-plus) affects risk transfer 
in engine development.  A fixed fee contract puts the risk of failure 
(higher engineering costs to develop a suitable system) on the 
contractor.  Cost-plus is the preferred contract type for new 
development programs where risk is inherently higher.  This puts 
the risk of higher engineering costs on the Government.  
 
6. Fighter Engine Competition: A Study of Factors Affecting Unit 
Price (Leginus, 1998) 
This was another cost study to determine the value of the competition.  It 
is much more clearly focused on the price paid per engine rather than the total 
costs (see the Hoover study, above).  Competition caused each manufacturer to 
begin at or near the ‘bottom’ of the learning curve (Nahmias, 2001): 
As experience is gained with the production of a particular 
product, either by a single worker or by an industry as a whole, 
the production process becomes more efficient. 
By quantifying the relationship that describes the gain in 
efficiency as the cumulative number of units produced 
increases, management can accurately predict the eventual 
capacity of existing facilities and the unit costs of production.   
33 
 Studies of the aircraft industry undertaken during the 1920s 
showed that the direct-labor hours required to produce a unit 
of output declined as the cumulative number of units produced 
increased.  The term learning curve was adopted to explain 
this phenomenon.   
       This is manifested by the subsequent engines produced could not be 
produced significantly cheaper by more experienced technicians.  However, 
ignored here is the fact the first engines produced are used for test and only the 
production engines are competed.  The key is defining exactly which engines 
(first test articles or first production units) are considered the ‘first units produced’ 
and which determines where the costs are on the curve.  See Table 3. Learning 
Curve Example (below).  The test engines are the first engines assembled and 
have the highest cost to produce whereas the first production engines will cost 
less to produce as processes are refined and experience is gained.  Engines 
typically follow a 70-75 % experience curve. 
 
Table 3.   Learning Curve Example (Wikipedia, 2005) 
 
By analyzing the learning curve, normalizing quantities and factoring 
inflation the author arrives at an index for the should cost for the engines before 
and after competition. 
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• Of importance was the discovery that neither engine 
quantity, inflation, nor competition directly affects engine unit cost.  
The unit prices of the engines did lower after the competition 
began.  It is just not clearly understood why. 
• Competition caused each manufacturer to begin at or near 
the ‘bottom’ of the learning curve.   
However, ignored here is the fact the first engines produced are used for 
test and only the production engines are competed. 
 
C.     JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROPULSION ACQUISITION 
Pratt and Whitney Military Engines, East Hartford, Conn., has been 
awarded a contract for more than $4 billion to develop the F135 propulsion 
system. This contract will cover ground and flight testing and production 
qualification of the Pratt & Whitney propulsion system. 
The Joint Strike Fighter acquisition strategy also calls for the development 
of two propulsion systems. The Pratt & Whitney system will compete, in 
production, with one developed by the team of General Electric and Rolls Royce. 
GE/RR are expected to receive a contract for the next phase of development of 
that system in the next few weeks. The P&W and GE/RR engines will be 
physically and functionally interchangeable in both the aircraft and support 
systems. All JSF aircraft variants will be able to use either engine. The 
competition starts in fiscal 2011 and continues through the life of the program to 
reduce risks. (JSF Public Affairs, F135 Description, 2005) 
The Joint Strike Fighter propulsion acquisition strategy is significantly 
different from the F-16 engine acquisition.  Although there are many similarities 
between JSF and the F-16 (they are both lightweight fighters with high 
affordability achieved through high foreign and domestic sales volume), the key 
differences and their potential impacts are discussed, below: 
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• The JSF engine competition has been congressionally mandated 
and planned for from the outset.  This has allowed P&W and the Fighter 
Engine Team (FET) to plan accordingly for production capacity.  It has 
also help guide decisions by knowing the maximum percent of the total 
fleet one manufacturer could provide.  It has affected contractor 
responsiveness from the outset for maximum value to the government.  
• Each propulsion system must be interchangeable in the aircraft (the 
F-16 engines were not interchangeable). This has an immediate affect on 
engine design, preventing a ‘performance race’ at the expense of 
reliability.  It also enables the customer to mix engines at the squadron 
level if desired.   
• The JSF early development has declared ‘Coopetition’ (the 
cooperation of the two companies in design integration and then, later, the 
competition as production begins).  This allows some reduction in the 
development cost of the FET F136 as it finalizes its design after the 
aircraft design has stabilized. 
• One Autonomic Support System will meet the customer’s needs for 
maintenance, supply, training, etc. for both engines.  All the Lockheed-
developed flightline support equipment is designed to support both 
engines.  This reduces the logistic impact of having two engines for the 
same aircraft.  This also enables the customers to easily transition from 
one engine variant to another. 
• Shared Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) sensors where 
feasible.  New to the JSF is the ability to predict engine component failure 
and react accordingly.  This will reduce secondary damage and improve 
aircraft availability as maintenance becomes a planned activity instead of 
a nasty surprise.  By sharing common PHM sensors and components 




D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Great Engine War was a success, but mostly for its intangible benefits 
such as improved customer response and contractor investment in reliability 
improvements.  No definitive proof of a substantial cost savings is evidenced.   
The planning for the JSF engine competition already reflects many of the 
lessons learned from the F-16 acquisition.  New strategies show much promise 
to reduce JSF propulsion acquisition costs and keep the contractor 
responsiveness at a high level. 
The next section will describe the process and sound methodology to 
guide the research. 
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III.  RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The research consisted of personal interviews conducted in person or by 
telephone and recorded for accuracy.  The interviews were carefully crafted and 
seven key stakeholders were selected to represent the small cadre of decision 
makers in the Government and industry.   
   
1. Interviewee Selection 
The Interviewee selection process began once the research on the F-16 
program was complete.  The research revealed those positions which were 
pivotal in shaping the outcome5.  The JSF Joint Program Office, P&W, GEAE, 
and the USAF Propulsion Support Program Office were then contacted for 
potential interviewees. 
The selected interviewees were: 
• Otha Davenport (Propulsion SPO Lead)  
• Ken Kohrs (Propulsion SPO Warranty Management) 
• Ed O’Donnell (P&W F100 International Programs) 
• Ken Murphy (GEAE F110 Foreign Military Sales) 
• Ken Poblenz (GEAE F110 Program Manager) 
• Pat Mattix (GEAE F110 Warranty Administration) 
• Phil Hughes (GEAE F110 Customer Support) 
• Stoney MacAdams (JSF Propulsion Acquisition IPT Lead) 
                                            
5 Interestingly, General Dynamics (GD), which later became Lockheed Martin Aeronautics 
Company (LMAC), was never mentioned in any of the studies as a factor in the Government 
decision to compete the engines.   
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2. Developing the Questions 
The questions for the interview were carefully crafted to elicit common 
themes and to highlight the different viewpoints representing the experiential 
perspective of each interviewee. 
 
a) Composing Appropriate Questions 
To ensure responses would not be negatively colored by the choice 
of questions, a careful analysis of each question was performed.  It was 
important to select questions which didn’t ask for specific data, but relied on the 
experiential perceptions of the interviewee.  From the GAO guidance:  
Avoid questions that require the interviewee to perform “audit work” 
to answer—that is, to consult records or other information sources.  
Personal questions should be avoided or used with extreme care. 
The same is true of questions that would tend to incriminate or 
show the interviewee in a bad light, particularly since the interview 
might terminate if they were asked (Chelimsky, 1991 p. 23).  
Because many of the interviewees made decisions that were 
enormously important to their respective organizations, I was careful to ensure 
the questions were neutral in tone and devoid of any possible bias.  
 
b) Organizing the Questions 
Additional GAO guidance is: 
Highly effective interviews center on answering only or possible two 
primary questions.  Secondary questions help gain a deeper 
understanding of the subject’s knowledge and often yield valuable 
learning.  If there are too many primary questions the subject is 
never fully explored and the interview results are usually less than 
adequate. 
To be highly effective, the interview must have secondary questions 
which are unambiguous and support the primary question.  Each 
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question should be ‘open-ended’ to avoid single word responses.  
(Chelimsky, 1991 p. 23). 
The research interviews conducted were centered on answering 
the primary question:  ‘What lessons learned can be derived from the "Great 
Engine War" to create recommendations for managing the Joint Strike Fighter 
engine competition?’  To further narrow the scope of the interview, but not limit it, 
the following secondary questions were used: 
 
• What were the positive and negative affects of the "Great Engine 
War" on F-16 acquisition decisions, production and support costs, 
engine performance, engine supportability, etc., and how might 
these factors apply to the JSF engine acquisition processes? 
• What were the F-16 competition criteria, how well did the 
contractors meet those criteria, and how might those criteria need 
to be changed for the JSF engine competition? 
• How did Foreign Military Sales (FMS) factor into the F-16 engine 
competition, and how should it be managed for the JSF? 
 
c) Conducting the interviews 
To gain the most from each interview, discussions began with 
introductions and the purpose of the interview.  Once at ease, each question was 
asked.  Interview answers were recorded to facilitate an accurate account.  GAO 
guidance on conducting interviews was followed: 
 
To oversimplify, the role of the interviewer is to ask the 
questions, while that of the interviewee is to respond with 
answers. Actually, the interviewer must perform at least eight 
major tasks:  
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• develop rapport with the interviewee and show interest, 
• give the interviewee a reason to participate, 
• elicit responsiveness from the interviewee, 
• ask questions in a prescribed order and manner, 
• ensure understanding, 
• ensure non-bias, and 
• obtain sufficient answers (Chelimsky, p. 78) 
 
Each interviewee was encouraged to fully answer each question 
and affirmed the answers in a non-committal way.   Careful attention was given 
by the interviewer to not judge the individual or respond with any pre-conceived 
ideas on the topic.  As a result, the interviewer was rewarded with a rich diversity 
of responses.  A genuine representation of the facts, opinions, and emotions of 
each interviewee emerged. 
 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Research questions had to be crafted carefully to support qualitative 
analysis methods, but open enough to capture any new knowledge and fully 
delve into the subject.   The interviewees had to be the actual veterans of the war 
willing to give their experience first-hand.  It was very important to ask each 
question and then listen to the responses to craft a pertinent follow-up question if 
necessary and to record all answers.  The following section fully examines the 
data collected and provides the reasoning for conclusions. 
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IV.  DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From the interviews and research, a clearer picture of the tumultuous time 
of the great engine war emerged.  Each stakeholder represented another facet of 
the situation clearly colored by their position and perception.   
 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR PROCESS 
To guide the interviews, an understanding of the influences that drive each 
of the stakeholders was needed to better frame their responses and weight them 
correctly in the final analysis. 
Each organization can be viewed as a system of actors which have 
influences and in turn exert influence on other members.  To better understand 
the perspective of each stakeholder, it is useful to perceive the organization 
through the filters of the ‘Strategic Design’, ‘Political’, or ‘Cultural’ lens of 
organizational behavior (Ancona, Kochan, Scully, Van Maanen, & Westney, 
1999, Module 2, p.7): 
 
1. Strategic Design Lens 
Certainly considered the ‘traditional’ view, the strategic view 
focuses on the organizational alignment of each team member.  The roles 
are clearly defined and each member can see the reporting relationships 
based solely on function.  Although very practical for an internal process 
such as a factory, it is inadequate for perceiving the motivations which 
also drive the decisions in an organization. 
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2. Political Lens 
The political lens looks at how power and influence are distributed 
and wielded.  Very often the real power in an organization does not 
conform neatly to the organization chart created by management to 
achieve the organization’s stated goals.  The political lens lets us see the 
motives and sometimes hidden agendas that guide actions of each 
stakeholder. 
 
3. Cultural Lens 
The cultural lens is very useful in identifying the underlying causes 
for why certain organizations seem to operate so much more cohesively 
than other similar organizations as viewed through the strategic design or 
political lens.  It attempts to bring to light the ‘whys’ an organization reacts 
as it does to each challenge.  It focuses on the personal history, norms, 
and basic human emotions and desires that build strong teams.   
 
The research used a combination of each of the lens – to properly view 
the forces and influences on each stakeholder.  This approach yielded valuable 
insight to possible motives in the responses. 
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Figure 17.   F-16 Engine Competition Stakeholders  
 
Each of the stakeholder organizations is briefly described, below: 
• Congress   The United States Congress authorizes programs 
to proceed and appropriates funding to pay for them.  Each 
member is elected and is very cognizant of each constituent’s 
interests on every bill before them.   Each program strives to 
answer queries and support investigations to keep ‘The Hill’ 
happy. 
• Office of The Secretary Of Defense (OSD)   OSD provides an 
integrating and oversight function for military programs.  All 
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though OSD doesn’t have the budget authority over the 
services, it does act as a gatekeeper to ensure the highest 
levels of scrutiny and review.   
• Secretary of the Air Force (SAF)   The SAF staff allocates 
funding and has direct oversight of each USAF program.  The 
SAF is concerned with maintaining the appearance of 
proprietary and impartial acquisition management while meeting 
the needs of the warfighters.  The SAF delegates authority to a 
System Program Office (SPO) to manage and balance the 
requirements and contract for systems which will meet the 
performance demands.   The SPO is usually focused on the 
immediate performance of the program and is keenly aware of 
the customer’s evolving desires.  The SPO Program Manger 
and much of the staff are subject to limited terms of involvement 
as the USAF reassigns its officers with regularity.  Program 
continuity is found in the SPO civilian support staff. 
• Contractors   For the F-16, General Dynamics (GD) was 
selected as the prime contractor to design, develop, and deliver 
the entire weapon system using SPO-procured engines as 
‘Government Furnished Equipment’ (GFE)6.  Pratt & Whitney 
was selected to integrate the F-15’s F100 engine to power the 
aircraft as GFE.  GEAE designed and delivered the F110 under 
the Alternate Engine Program.  Each contractor is incentivized 
to meet the SPO’s requirements and to please company 
shareholder’s concerns for short-term profitability. 
• Tactical Air Command (TAC)   The ultimate customer for the 
F-16, the TAC (now Air Combat Command) fighter squadrons 
budget for operations and maintenance funding from Congress 
                                            
6 The other option was for the government to let General Dynamics select and contract for 
the engine and deliver it as ‘Contractor Furnished Equipment’ (CFE) with the aircraft.   
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to fly and maintain the weapon system in combat.  The TAC 
desire is for safe, effective and affordable weapon systems. 
 
In this case, the Great Engine War was an emotional time for the 
stakeholders.  An analysis of the interviews as seen through the cultural lens 
yields valuable insight: 
• The P&W employees would feel betrayed by a faithful customer 
(USAF) that would call into question Pratt’s commitment and 
service and try to take their business away. The company’s 
management worked to circumvent the SPO, SAF, and OSD by 
pushing Congress to act favorably for them and quell the 
competition initiative. 
• The GEAE team had lost the lion share of the fighter engine 
business to P&W would be grateful to get a chance at the 
potentially lucrative program and be eager to please.  The focus 
was on gaining a share of the market and working to meet the 
SPO’s requirements.  After all, ‘part of something is better than all 
of nothing’! 
• The F-16 System Program Office discovered it no longer had the 
direct power to influence P&W to meet USAF customer demands 
for as-delivered performance of the engines. The threat of 
competition now empowered the SPO to influence the outcome.  
The initiators of the competition would be expected to act with 
human nature, that is to say, pre-disposed to justify their decision to 
compete and not be critical of it.  There was resentment towards 
P&W for going straight to Congress to attempt to sidetrack the 
competition effort. (Camm, 1993) 
• General Dynamics was able to keep out of the fray and emerged 
unscathed throughout the ‘war’.  The neutral posture of GD 
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management certainly helped in keeping them from suffering any 
consequences. 
The political dynamic is evidenced in the Government Accounting Office 
audit requested by none other than the Senators from Connecticut and Florida 
(home of P&W’s two main plants).  The GAO audit and P&W direct appeals to 
Congress were ineffective.  The effort to exert external influence on the SPO only 
served to increase the Government resolve for competition to bring back into 
balance the power in the relationship.   
 
C. RESEARCH ANAYLSIS METHOD 
The research analysis relied on qualitative versus quantitative methods.  
The quantitative approach is based on ‘fact tables’ of pure data.  The researcher 
then looks for conclusions to understand factors in a situation from the sheer 
volume of data collected. 
Qualitative research on the other hand, is embraced by the social scientific 
community and relies on relatively few but intensive interviews.  The researcher 
then derives the impacts and focuses on the interviewee’s experiences 
normalized for the cultural factors present.  This method recognizes that every 
person perceives a situation colored by their experience base, emotions, and 
personal impacts from a situation (Nagy Hesse-Biber & Levy, 2004).    
Interview questions were purposely structured as open-ended and the 
interview process left room for additional insight and wisdom from the 
interviewee.  Other ways to gain qualitative analysis include: 
• Observation (Direct and Indirect) 
• Interaction 
• Interview 
• Narrative (Nagy Hesse-Biber & Levy, 2004) 
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This research relied on interviews due to the fact that the observed events 
have already occurred, the stakeholders have all moved on to different jobs or 
retired, and the inherent efficiency of the interview process. 
 
D. INTERVIEW RESULTS 
Research interviews were conducted during the period of 16 April through 
June 28, 2004.  These interviews yielded new knowledge and an affirmation of 
data provided by previous studies performed on this subject.  The general 
themes that emerged from the actual interview quotes are provided below as 
they relate to each research question: 
 
1. “What Were The Positive Affects Of The ‘Great Engine War’ On 
F-16 Acquisition Decisions, Production And Support Costs, 
Engine Performance, Engine Supportability, Etc., And How 
Might These Factors Apply To The JSF Engine Acquisition 
Processes?” 
• “Pratt and Whitney proposals following the 
competition were much more comprehensive and 
addressed the admitted shortfalls in their design. Pratt 
responsiveness improved in many large and small 
ways (S. MacAdams, personal communication, June 
28, 2004).” 
• “Engine per-unit costs were lower after GEAE entered 
the market. But the reduction was less than 5%, not a 
significant difference but more than without the 
competition.  This was due to the engines being 
closer to the bottom of their learning curve (E. 
O’Donnell, personal communication, May 12, 2004).”     
• "Drove improvements in [engine] design (O. 
Davenport, personal communication, April 16, 2004).” 
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• “It forced everyone to ‘sharpen their pencils’ and 
really look at design and cost.  This yields the lowest 
possible acquisition cost [for the Government].  
Foreign Military Sales customers benefited also from 
improved service (K. Murphy, personal 
communication, April 23, 2004).”    
 
2.  “What Were The Negative Affects Of The ‘Great Engine War’ 
On F-16 Acquisition Decisions, Production And Support Costs, 
Engine Performance, Engine Supportability, Etc., And How 
Might These Factors Apply To The JSF Engine Acquisition 
Processes?” 
• “Supportability was impacted, as support systems 
were duplicated which increased footprint.  This was 
caused by not having a common aircraft which led to 
difficulty in determining who would receive F110 or 
F100 engines/aircraft (O. Davenport, personal 
communication, April 16, 2004).”  
• “Politics affected the Government buy decisions. The 
perception was that industrial base support was more 
important than selecting the contractor with the best 
price (K. Murphy, personal communication, April 23, 
2004).”   
• “The focus on acquisition cost pushed support costs 
up.  What was needed was a firm metric for total 
ownership cost (K. Poblenz, personal communication, 
April 23, 2004).”  
• “The advantage was given to better the engine with 
better thrust performance.  This could drive one 
competitor out of the business if [higher] thrust was a 
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criteria (E. O’Donnell, personal communication, May 
12, 2004).” 
• “Aircraft were not interchangeable – affected long 
lead time and delivery (O. Davenport, personal 
communication, April 16, 2004).”  
 
3.  “What Were The F-16 Competition Criteria, How Well Did The 
Contractors Meet Those Criteria, And How Might Those 
Criteria Need To Be Changed For The JSF Engine 
Competition?” 
• “Price to an extent, but quality was greater (E. 
O’Donnell, personal communication, May 12, 2004).”  
• “Warranty and logistic support – of these - warranty 
was wasted money (K. Murphy, personal 
communication, April 23, 2004).” 
• “Price (acquisition), basing (having to buy in lots to 
support a complete squadron stand-up.  It would be 
prohibitive to ‘mix’ squadrons of P&W and GEAE 
engines), and Operations & Support (O&S) cost (O. 
Davenport, personal communication, April 16, 2004).” 
• “The focus was on improving reliability, warranty, 
an1d reduction in unit price.  The JSF should have a 
similar focus, but with Performance Based Logistics 
for sustainment and no warranty.  Competition can be 
expected to change as the program reaches the end 
of production (when buying only a few spares 
[engines] a year) (S. MacAdams, personal 
communication, June 28, 2004).” 
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4.  “How Did Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Factor Into The F-16 
Engine Competition and How Should It Be Managed For The 
JSF?” 
• “Kept competition going much longer (K. Poblenz, 
personal communication, April 23, 2004).”  
• “Competition encourages cost/overhead ‘offsets’.7  
This is not the most efficient way to allocate costs.  
Direct sales to FMS customers are ‘bad’ for 
competition and can only drive up the Government 
cost (E. O’Donnell, personal communication, May 12, 
2004).”   
• “Affects US cost with the potential for different price 
structures (S. MacAdams, personal communication, 
June 28, 2004).”  
• “Thrust not a factor – but did affect the [FMS] buys! 
The F110 had more thrust, but more safety issues (O. 
Davenport, personal communication, April 16, 2004).” 
• “Competition is best managed as a ‘buying club’ for all 
[JSF] customers.  The best gains are realized by 
combined buying power and then dealing with the 
allocation distribution (S. MacAdams, personal 
communication, June 28, 2004).” 
                                            
7 ‘Offsets’ are defined as the shift of overhead costs to other non-competed programs. This 
helps the competed contract price appear lower, thus making the competed offer more attractive.  
Other (non-competed) programs would increase in price.  
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5.  “Should the JSF Pursue a Component Improvement Program 
(CIP)?” 
The CIP is used by in-service propulsion programs to continue 
development and testing of engines to refine the design for reliability.  Each 
program then requests funding to implement the design improvements as an 
Engineering Change Proposal.  To maintain a fair competition, it is assumed 
that each JSF propulsion contractor would receive equal amounts of CIP 
funding. 
This was a highly divisive question, with strong sentiments both for and 
against CIP.  As you see from the responses - no interviewee was at a loss for 
an opinion!   
• “Yes! To guide contractors to fix what is important to 
the government customer - reliability (O. Davenport, 
personal communication, April 16, 2004).”  
• “No! In competition the contractor pays for any 
[reliability] fixes – why should we pay twice?  It 
doesn’t make sense (S. MacAdams, personal 
communication, June 28, 2004).” 
• “Yes! CIP levels the competition or prolongs it (one 
side never too far from winning next competition 
round).  It could be used to fund thrust or reliability 
depending on the situation (O. Davenport, personal 
communication, April 16, 2004).”  
• “No! CIP is only needed for sole source acquisition – 
not for competition (K. Murphy, personal 
communication, April 23, 2004).”   
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• “Yes! Contractor profit drives decisions for reliability 
and not necessarily safety (O. Davenport, personal 
communication, April 16, 2004).”  
• “No! Mission and engine useage is a bigger factor that 
affects reliability more than design (P. Mattix, 
personal communication, April 23, 2004).” 
• “No! The government used CIP [for the F-16 engines] 
to ‘level the playing field’ by helping the poor 
performing engines instead of letting the market force 
them (O. Davenport, personal communication, April 
16, 2004).”  
The differences in the responses reflect different viewpoints – 
sometimes from the same interviewee!  Further analysis was performed 
by properly weighting each argument (both for and against) by the 
following criteria: 
• Applicability to the unique JSF acquisition strategy 
and environment. 
• Compliance with current DoD policy guidance for 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL). 
There are implicit incentives for the contractor to improve product reliability 
and performance.  The two greatest forces are competition and Performance 
Based Logistics (PBL).  Lesser inducements for better product performance are 
corporate reputation and the expectation of future business.  To better 
understand the force of PBL, refer to the DoD PBL guidance (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2005): 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is the preferred Department of 
Defense (DoD) product support strategy to improve weapons 
system readiness by procuring performance, which capitalizes on 
integrated logistics chains and public/private partnerships. The 
cornerstone of PBL is the purchase of weapons system 
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sustainment as an affordable, integrated package based on output 
measures such as weapons system availability, rather than input 
measures, such as parts and technical services. The Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 
directed the application of PBL to new and legacy weapons 
systems. PBL Implementation is also mandated by DoD Directive 
5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003.  
 
The experiences of the interviewees, in most cases preceded the latest 
DoD guidance and implementation of Performance Based Logistics (PBL).  As a 
result, these responses must be factored against current PBL guidance to 
properly assess the relevance of those interviewee responses which supported 
CIP involvement: 
‘To guide contractors to fix what is important to the government customer - 
reliability’ 
CIP is not the only way to incentivize the contractor to improve 
reliability.  PBL contracts are more profitable for the contractor 
when the engine stays ’on-wing’ and is not returned for 
maintenance.  The investment in reliability improvements by the 
contractor are justified by these lower future costs. 
‘CIP levels the competition or prolongs it (one side never too far 
from winning next competition round).  It could be used to fund 
thrust or reliability depending on the situation’.  
Thrust is also closely bounded by JSF performance specifications 
and overall system boundaries (engine size, fuel consumption, 
engine inlet size, etc.).  Initial reliability is specified and part of the 
engine qualification process.  The contractor would improve thrust 
or reliability to compete for a greater share of the acquisition and to 
reduce support costs. 
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‘Contractor profit drives decisions for reliability not necessarily safety’. 
By including periods of safe operation as a factor in the 
competition, the contractor becomes incentivized to meet safety 
requirements as well as reliability. 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Many lessons learned have been gleaned from the interviews with the 
veterans of the first engine war and are invaluable for guiding the next great 
engine war.  The interviews were structured to gather perspectives and guidance 
from the stakeholders of the subject engine competition.  Studies of the 
organizational structure through the ‘cultural’ and ‘political lenses’ were helpful to 
properly frame the responses.  
Overall, a consensus among interviewees was that engine competition is 
a good thing and certainly resulted in improved responsiveness at P&W.  The 
negative impacts to competition centered on supportability and the competition 
criteria not necessarily tied to actual product performance.  The competition 
criteria need to include acquisition costs and support costs to properly incentivize 
improved product reliability investments.  Foreign Military Sales (FMS) can 
extend competition past the US Government acquisition period, but FMS must be 
balanced in the competition equation and included in supportability planning.   
Lastly, the CIP participation by JSF is obviated by the forces of 
competition and PBL.  The performance based logistics and competition factors 
will encourage the competitors to improve their baseline product reliability without 
the Government funding additional testing and analysis.  The Great Engine War 
competition produced design improvements from both P&W and GEAE.   
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V.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
A thorough analysis of the ‘Great Engine War’ literature and interviews 
with stakeholders has yielded the following conclusions which are useful for any 
program to guide their competition strategy: 
 
1. Propulsion System Competition is Highly Advantageous When 
the Procurement is Relatively Large 
This is due to the market entry and exit barriers inherent in the aircraft 
engine business.  Systems procured for low quantity fleets (the B-2 Spirit F117 
engine for example) simply can’t justify the approximately doubled development 
cost for an alternate engine for competition.  Each new system must perform the 
analysis based on its unique situation (Hoover, 1986). 
 
2. Competition Should Be Continued On a Recurring Basis for as 
Long as Possible to Derive the Maximum Benefit 
Interview responses suggest this is admittedly difficult and requires a 
balanced competition among approximately equal competitors continually vying 
for an increased portion of the market.  The ‘level playing field’ must be 
maintained by not overtly or covertly rewarding higher thrust performance.  If one 
competitor is consistently losing, their mediocre performance is tacitly rewarded 
by a steady contract and guaranteed (if admittedly smaller) profits… 
 
3. Avoid a ‘Winner Takes All’ Mentality 
Each competitor needs to be awarded a yearly minimum buy amount 
sufficient to keep a viable production line open to respond to future competition.   
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4. Plan for Competition from the Outset 
Perform the analysis early in the acquisition process to determine if 
competition of the system or sub-system is justified.  The value of positive 
impacts to reliability and assurance (through competition) of the lowest possible 
acquisition and support costs should be considered.  Design the system for 
complete commonality for either competed sub-system.   Specify in the 
requirements document a single support system (to include common support 
equipment, information handling, training, and technical data formats). 
 
5. Plan for Performance Based Logistics for Sustainment 
Under PBL each contractor will be incentivized to keep driving lower the 
government cost for Operations and Maintenance.  Legacy systems such as the 
F-16, pay the contractors for parts and equipment to repair failed components.  
Under PBL, the contractor is paid on a cost/operating hour basis.  If the aircraft 
system doesn’t fail – the contractor enjoys 100% profit.  The contractor is guided 
by profit and a reliable system is more profitable.  The contractor can easily 
justify investing in engineering efforts to fix reliability degraders (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2005). 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
To specifically guide the Joint Strike Fighter propulsion system acquisition 
and manage the competition between P&W and GEAE/RR, the JSF Program 
Office should carefully consider the following recommendations: 
 
1. Strictly Adhere To Airframe Commonality for Either Propulsion 
System 
The long lead time and basing considerations required by a unique 
airframe for each propulsion system would only complicate the competition 
process and yield less-than optimal results (Camm, 1993).  To help level the 
acquisitions, and yet retain deploying F-35s as whole fighting units, the JPO 
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should consider letting only the training site squadrons (which usually do not 
deploy) be equipped with both F135 and F136-powered aircraft (if necessary to 
balance the acquisition numbers of F135s and F136s resulting from competition).   
 
2. Competition Criteria Must Include Supportability Costs 
By keeping PBL sustainment as competition criteria, the contractor will be 
incentivized to reduce acquisition cost and sustainment costs (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2005). 
 
3. Do Not Pursue a Warranty Strategy 
From the interviews and PBL guidance, the warranty and its associated 
cost is rendered obsolete.  Poor engine performance would cost the contractor 
sales in future competitions. 
 
4. Plan for Competition On An Annual Basis 
Each competition cycle is an opportunity for the competitors to further 
refine and reduce the cost of their proposals.  By extending the competition for as 
long as practicable, the maximum benefit to the government is realized (Ogg, 
1987). 
 
5. Maintain A Concerted Effort To Encourage Both Competitors 
To Attempt To Win The Maximum Share 
Emphasize the continuing government requirement for contractor-provided 
PBL sustainment even after production ceases.  The supplier of the majority of 
the operating fleet will also enjoy the lion share of the sustainment funding for the 
rest of the program.  This should keep one competitor from being satisfied with a 
small, albeit guaranteed, business.  
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6. Do Not Participate In the Component Improvement Program 
(CIP) 
From the interviews and DoD guidance, the competition and PBL will drive 
the contractors to produce a more robust design and to rapidly react to reliability 
problems.  The only other reason to apply for CIP funding is to help failing 
competitors boost reliability and thus remain competitive.  This charitable act 




The conclusions could help guide future programs considering the 
competition for acquisition of sub-systems.  The proper assessment of possible 
candidates relies primarily on quantity.  The competed systems require careful 
planning for interchangeability and support system commonality. 
The recommendations should provide some guidance as the acquisition 
for JSF propulsion systems continues through the next decade. 
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